Richard Lillich Memorial Lecture: Nurturing a Transnational System of Innovaton by Reichman, Jerome H.
143 
                                                                                                                  
RICHARD LILLICH MEMORIAL LECTURE:  
NURTURING A TRANSNATIONAL SYSTEM OF 
INNOVATION 
 
JEROME H. REICHMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION……………………………………………... 143 
II. REGULATORY PARADOXES OF THE NEW GLOBAL 
ECONOMY…………………………………………………… 
 
144 
III. BALANCING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERESTS IN AN 
INCIPIENT TRANSNATIONAL SYSTEM OF INNOVATION... 
 
147 
IV. MAINTAINING THE SUPPLY OF KNOWLEDGE AS A 
GLOBAL PUBLIC GOOD……………………………………. 
A. Rationalizing the Protection of Cumulative and 
Sequential Innovation…………………………………….. 
B. A Moratorium on Stronger International…………... 
Intellectual Property Standard-Setting Exercises 
C. New Institutional Initiatives…………………………. 
 
151 
 
155 
158 
 
160 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS…………………………………… 163 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
At a College of Europe Workshop1 in 2007, I was asked to 
elaborate on the idea that what really emerged from the World 
Trade Orangization’s (“WTO”) Agreement on Trade-Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property law (“TRIPS Agreement”)2 in 1994 
was “an incipient transnational system of innovation.” 3 This idea 
was initially put forward in an article that Keith Maskus and I 
published in our book about the growing tendency of multilateral 
intellectual property negotiations to disrupt the capacity of nation 
states to maintain the supply of such critical public goods as edu-
cation, public health, environmental safety, and scientific re-
 
 * Copyright Jerome H. Reichman, 2007, Bunyan S. Womble Professor of Law, Duke 
University School of Law, Durham, North Carolina. An earlier version of this article ap-
peared in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PUBLIC POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 17-41 (Inge 
Govaere & Hanns Ullrich eds., 2007). 
 1.  College of Europe, Workshop on Issues of Public Policy and Trade in Intellectual 
Property Law, Bruges, Belgium, Oct. 5, 2005. 
 2.  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including 
Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion, Annex 1C, Apr. 15 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1154 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
 3. Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge 
Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND 
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 3, 33-41 
(Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005).  [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 
GOODS AND IP].  
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search.4  In the present article, I will summarize some of the main 
themes from our previous work and focus attention on the difficul-
ties of nurturing a transnational system of innovation that could 
properly balance the needs of states at different levels of economic 
development. 
Part I identifies some of the paradoxes that have emerged from 
overzealous efforts to re-regulate the global economy, in order to 
make it safe for investors in the production of knowledge goods, 
despite the long-standing drive of trade policy to deregulate that 
same economy in the name of free competition. Part II discusses 
the governance deficiencies that currently frustrate the need to 
balance public and private interests at the multilateral level. 
Part III focuses on specific problems of maintaining the supply 
of knowledge as a global public good5 in the face of the high-
protectionist ethos driving current trade policy and of the govern-
ance problems identified in Part II. Part IV concludes with a warn-
ing about the risks of succumbing to a dogmatic intellectual prop-
erty ideology precisely at a moment when history beckons state 
actors to engage in open-minded experimentation with promising 
new technologies and with new legal tools to promote their devel-
opment and widespread diffusion. 
 
II. REGULATORY PARADOXES OF THE NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY 
 
Let me first point out that, in an effort to promote trade in 
knowledge goods, we have paradoxically and energetically been re-
regulating the global economy in ways that contradict the sixty-
year historical mission of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT).6 That mission was precisely to deregulate the 
global economy in the interest of free competition.7
I find it disconcerting that “free traders” acquiesce so readily in 
this process of re-regulation, without critically examining the 
premise that ever-expanding intellectual property rights must en-
hance global economic welfare. One high-level governmental study, 
and many reputable intellectual property scholars, have ques-
 
 4.  See generally INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3. 
 5. See, e.g., J.E. Stiglitz, Knowledge as a Public Good, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY ( I. Kaul et al., eds., 1999). 
 6. Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, Apr. 15 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 33 I.L.M. 1154 [hereinafter GATT 
1994]. 
 7. See, e.g., John H. Jackson, GATT and the Future of International Trade Institu-
tions, 28 BROOK J. INT’L. L. 11 (1992).  
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tioned the wisdom behind this high-protectionist agenda.8 Profes-
sor Thomas Dreier’s thoughtful comments on this and related top-
ics also reflect growing concerns about ever-expanding intellectual 
property rights, at least with regard to the border with competition 
law.9 Nevertheless, the notion that more intellectual property pro-
tection necessarily translates into more innovation has been so 
successfully promoted in recent years that few trade economists 
even bother to ask whether multiplying legal monopolies may not 
hamstring innovation and competitive enterprise in the end. 
When the GATT was adopted, the prevailing norm at the in-
ternational level was that intellectual property rights represented 
islands of protection in a sea of free competition. Those islands 
were largely left to the domestic laws, which, however, were sub-
ject to norms of reasonableness and necessity under Article XX(d) 
of the GATT 1947.10 This provision expressly ordained that domes-
tic intellectual property laws should not become disguised barriers 
to trade.11
In contrast, when one reviews the massive amounts of intellec-
tual property legislation that characterize the post-TRIPS model at 
every level, it seems more accurate to speak of islands of competi-
tion in a sea of legal monopolies. It is at best unclear who repre-
sents the larger public interest12 in negotiating forums dominated 
by powerful multinational firms that behave increasingly like a 
 
 8. See, e.g., Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (CIPR), Integrating Intellec-
tual Property Rights and Development Policy 8, 21-27 (2000) [hereinafter CIPR]; Carlos M. 
Correa, Internationalization of the Patent System and New Technologies, 20 WIS. INT’L. L.J. 
523, 544-50 (2002); John. H. Barton, The Economics of TRIPS: International Trade in In-
formation Intensive Products, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 473 (2001); Ruth L. Okediji, Pub-
lic Welfare and the Role of the WTO: Reconsidering the TRIPS Agreement, 17 EMORY INT’L L. 
REV. 819 (2003); James Boyle, A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of Intellectual Property, 
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 9 (2004). For an insightful review and analysis of this literature, see 
Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2821 
(2006). 
 9. See Thomas Dreier, Shaping a Fair International IPR-Regime in a Globalized 
World—Some Parameters for Public Policy, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PUBLIC POLICY, 
AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 43-75 (Inge Govaere & Hanns Ullrich eds., 2007). 
 10. See GATT 1994, supra note 6, at art. XX(d), carrying forward original article XX(d) 
in GATT 1947. 
 11. See GATT 1994, supra note 6, at art. XX, chapeau clause, disallowing measures 
that constitute “a disguised restriction on international trade” (carrying forward same lan-
guage from GATT 1947). 
 12. For a discussion of the ambiguities inherent in the term “public interest,” see 
Dreier, supra note 9, who correctly observes that IPRs are given birth as an expression of 
the public interest in creativity and innovation. Maskus & Reichman, in INTERNATIONAL 
PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3, did not equate the larger public interest with consumer 
access to knowledge or knowledge goods as such, although it is one component of a broader 
equation. Nor do we equate the broader public interest with “the sum total of private inter-
ests.” That, indeed, is why we chose to focus on the “privatization of global public goods.” 
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“knowledge cartel.”13 This process has been dramatically evidenced 
in the recent Free Trade Negotiations, where the United States 
Trade Representative (USTR) directly espouses the interests of the 
pharmaceutical and entertainment industries, among others, in 
securing provisions that sometimes exceed what is permitted by 
congressionally enacted U.S. laws.14
Yet, there is reason to fear that the members of this “knowl-
edge cartel” are more interested in “lock[ing] in temporary com-
petitive advantages” from existing innovation than in formulating 
measures that would advance “the global public interest in [future] 
innovation, competition, or the provision of complementary public 
goods.”15 This one-sided drive to re-regulate the global economy 
thus produces distortions to trade that can impede worldwide eco-
nomic growth in the long term. 
For example, re-regulation can disrupt the transfer of technol-
ogy under market conditions by allowing dominant firms to refuse 
to deal with would-be competitors in developing countries or to 
demand such increased rent extraction for up-to-date technology 
(based on immunities from reverse-engineering under TRIPS) that 
the welfare gains from technology installation are lost. Moreover, 
the same intellectual property standards that impede reverse-
engineering also hinder local manufacturers’ efforts to add value 
and improvements to the existing technological base.16
“Without a legitimizing governance process that adequately 
represents all stakeholders,” Maskus and I fear that a re-regulated 
global market will “reflect dubious practices in developed markets 
for knowledge goods that may actually hamper both innovation 
and competition in the long run.”17 There is a “further risk that an 
over-regulated market for knowledge goods could compromise the 
 
 13. Id. at 19. See also John. Barton, Integrating IPR Policies in Development Strate-
gies, in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE (C. Bellman et al., eds., 2003) (stressing difficulties of entry 
into markets “dominated by multinational oligopolies” that are “compounded by the interna-
tional IP system”). 
 14. See Frederick M. Abbott, Intellectual Property Rights in a Global Trade Frame-
work:  Trends in Developing Countries, 98 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. Proceedings 95, 97 (2004); 
Graham Dutfield, North/South: An Assymetric Global Market?, paper presented at the An-
nual Meeting of the International Association for the Advancement of Teaching and Re-
search in Intellectual Property (ATRIP), Parma, Italy, 9-11 September 2006. 
 15. Maskus & Reichman, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 
19. 
 16. See, e.g., Carlos M. Correa, Can the TRIPS Agreement Foster Technology Transfer 
to Developing Countries?, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 227-56; 
Lee G. Branstetter, Do Stronger Patents Induce More Local Innovation?, in INTERNATIONAL 
PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 309-20. 
 17. Maskus & Reichman, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 
20. 
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ability of nation states to supply other public goods that only they 
can provide in a decentralized world economy.”18
Beyond the potential negative effects on innovation, the drive 
for ever stronger international IP standards is also disrupting the 
provision of other key public goods that are essential components 
of global public welfare, such as education, public health, environ-
mental protection, food, security, scientific research, and competi-
tion.19 Increasingly, the knowledge inputs needed to promote these 
public goods are subject to exclusive property rights, and they are 
made available at high prices or on terms and conditions that ren-
der it difficult for ministries to provide essential public goods at 
the national level. Yet, these ministries were usually not repre-
sented at the negotiating forums where international intellectual 
property standards were set; and in these forums, there has been 
little regard to the impacts of intellectual property rights on the 
provisions of global public goods generally. 
 
III. BALANCING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERESTS IN AN INCIPIENT 
TRANSNATIONAL SYSTEM OF INNOVATION 
 
Maskus and I concede that an “incipient transnational system 
of innovation” could enable successful innovators in all 
countries20—developed or developing—to reach an integrated 
world market.21 If one believes that carefully calibrated intel-
lectual property rights provide needed incentives to invest in risky 
forms of innovation, the public benefits likely to accrue from 
 
 18. Id. at 20. See generally PROVIDING GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: MANAGING GLOBALIZA-
TION (I. Kaul et al., eds., 2003); SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBAL-
IZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (Cambridge University Press 2003). 
 19. See, e.g. Paul A. David,  Koyaanisqatsi in Cyberspace: The Economics of an ‘Out-of-
Balance’ Regime of Private Property Rights in Data and Information, in INTERNATIONAL 
PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 81-120; Ruth Okediji, Sustainable Access to Copy-
righted Digital Information Works in Developing Countries, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 
GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 142-87; Frederick M. Abbott, Managing the Hydra: The Her-
culean Task of Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS 
AND IP, supra note 3 at 393-424; Hans Ullrich, Expansionist Intellectual Property Protection 
and Reductionist Competition Rules: A TRIPS Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 
GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 726-57. 
 20. Maskus & Reichman, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 
33-35 (stressing that “[a]ll countries could benefit from a functionally efficient transnational 
system of innovation if low barriers to entry enabled entrepreneurs anywhere to invest in 
the production and distribution of knowledge goods.”). 
 21. See, e.g., Asish Arora, Andrea Fosfuri & Alfonso Gambardella, Markets for Tech-
nology, Intellectual Property Rights and Development, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND 
IP, supra note 3 at 321-336; see also Michael Blakeney, Stimulating Agricultural Innova-
tion, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 367-390; Keith E. Maskus, 
Kamal Saggi  & Thitima Puttitanum, Patent Rights and International Technology Transfer 
Through Direct Investment and Licensing, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra 
note 3 at 265-80. 
148  J. OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 16:2 
 
                                                                                                                  
logical progress under such a worldwide system are potentially in-
calculable.22
There are serious obstacles to achieving such progress, how-
ever. In practice, the different national and regional capabilities 
and endowments of WTO Members limit their absorptive capaci-
ties and reduce the potential benefits of open markets for knowl-
edge goods. This “technological divide” is widened by the high 
rents that must now be paid to technology exporters and by the 
absence of provisions conferring differential and more favorable 
treatment on developing countries under the TRIPS Agreement,23 
even though that principle had been enshrined in the GATT (1947) 
at the end of the Tokyo Round in 1979.24 The only differential 
treatment under TRIPS is now reserved for Least-Developed 
Countries (LDCs), the poorest of the poor, whose general compli-
ance obligations have just been extended to 2013 (in addition to 
further exemptions for the patenting of pharmaceutical producst 
until 2016).25
Disregarding the LDCs, all other developing countries—
whether they fall in the high, medium, or low income brackets—
must accordingly compete in markets for knowledge goods on 
roughly the same normative terms and conditions that govern ad-
vanced industrialized countries. A growing number of these devel-
oping countries have demonstrated considerable capacity in some 
technological fields, and some are beginning to challenge the tech-
nological supremacy of the OECD countries.26 Nevertheless, all of 
 
 22. See, e.g., M. P. Ryan, Useful Knowledge and the Development Agenda Debate at 
WIPO, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Association for the Ad-
vancement of Teaching and Research in Intellectual Property (ATRIP), Parma, Italy, 9-11 
September 2006. However, some commentators believe that many developing countries 
should focus on comparative advantages in agriculture and other local endowments, rather 
than technological innovation. See, e.g., Dreier, supra note 9. 
 23. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 65 (Transitional Arrangements). 
 24. See GATT (1947), supra note 6, Part IV, “Results of the Uruguay Round — Legal 
Texts” 533-37 (1994). 
 25. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 65-66; World Trade Organization, Min-
isterial, Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WTO Doc. 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/2, 14 November 2001 [hereinafter Doha Declaration on Public Health], 
A7; Decision by the Council for TRIPS of 27 June 2002, Extension of the Transition Period 
under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement for Least-Developed Country Members for Cer-
tain Obligations with respect to Pharmaceutical Products Council for Trade-Related Aspect 
of Intellectual Property Rights,  WTO Doc. IP/C/25, (July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Decision on 
the 2016 Extension]. LDCs may postpone implementation of other TRIPS obligations, in-
cluding the duty to provide patent protection for products other than pharmaceuticals, until 
2013. See Decision by the Council for TRIPS of 29 November 2005, Extension of the Transi-
tion Period under Article 66.1 for Least-Developed Country Members, WTO Doc. IP/C/40 
(Nov. 30, 2005) [hereinafter Decision on the 2013 Extension]. During these transition peri-
ods, LDCs must continue to respect national treatment and most-favored-nation (MFN) 
obligations under arts. 3-4 of the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2. 
 26. See, e.g., J. Straus, The Impact of GATT and TRIPS on Economic Development, 
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them are struggling to cope with the enormous challenges and 
burdens, including financial burdens, thrust upon them by a uni-
versal set of relatively high intellectual property standards.27
These burdens and challenges affect even those developing 
countries that are not actively engaged in the production of knowl-
edge goods. Such countries must nonetheless organize and main-
tain the defense of foreign intellectual property owners, with seri-
ous repercussions for their internal ability to meet, say, public 
education and public health goals at prices their general popula-
tions can afford.28
In other words, even developing countries that opt out of the 
world’s innovation “tournaments” must engage in burdensome ef-
forts to cope with the social costs of world intellectual property 
norms, including the distributional inequities that poverty greatly 
magnifies. They must cope, with varying degrees of success, with 
the so-called “flexibilities” built into the TRIPS Agreement itself, 
which could, if mastered, potentially lower those same social 
costs.29 Increasingly, developing countries must also deal with offi-
cial and unofficial pressures and threats to provide higher TRIPS-
plus levels of intellectual property protection, which may become 
embodied in bilateral or regional Free Trade Agreements.30
When, instead, developing countries opt into the production of 
knowledge goods for local consumption or export purposes, they 
face an even more complex and burdensome “balancing act.” On 
the one hand, they must internalize universal IP norms in ways 
that stimulate relevant industrial sectors having innovative poten-
 
paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the International Association for the Advance-
ment of Teaching and Research in Intellectual Property (ATRIP), Parma, Italy, 9-11 Sep-
tember 2006 (stressing successes of China and India). See also Dutfield, supra note 14 (pre-
dicting shift in terms of knowledge goods trade to detriment of current technology export-
ers). 
 27. See generally CIPR, supra note 8. See also Chon, supra note 8 at 2839-58 (criticiz-
ing intergovernmental efforts and scholarly analysis of IP problems as insufficiently 
grounded in development theory and practice). 
 28. See, e.g., Okediji, supra note 19; Abbott, supra note 19. See also Timothy Swanson 
& Timo Goeschl, Diffusion and Distribution: The Impacts on Poor Countries of Technological 
Enforcement Within the Biotechnological Sector, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, 
supra note 3 at 669-94. 
 29. For detailed discussion of these flexibilities, see generally, U.N. CONFERENCE ON 
TRADE & DEV. (UNCTAD) AND INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DE-
VELOPMENT (ICTSD), RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT (2005). See also 
Jerome H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the 
TRIPS Agreement, 29 NYU J. INT’L. L. & POL. 11 (1997); Carolos M. Correa, Formulating 
Effective Pro-Development National Intellectual property Policies, in TRADING IN KNOWL-
EDGE, supra note 13 at 209 et seq. For discussion of distributional effects, see, e.g., Peter M. 
Gerhart, Distributive Values and Institutional Design in the Provision of Global Public 
Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 69-77. 
 30. Supra note 14. 
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tial without, however, legally discriminating against foreign com-
petitors. The national treatment principle of the TRIPS Agree-
ment31—which the WTO Appellate Body has deemed a cardinal 
premise of the worldwide intellectual property system32 —thus re-
inforces the lack of “differential and more favorable treatment” in 
that same Agreement. 
This formidable challenge is then made considerably more dif-
ficult by the countervailing welfare goals these countries must also 
meet, for political reasons, among others, with respect to, say, pub-
lic health and public education. Here, in short, even economically 
dynamic developing countries must resolve tensions between cali-
brating TRIPS-compliant domestic IP norms to stimulate innova-
tion and adjusting the same set of norms to provide access to 
knowledge and medicines on affordable terms and conditions.33 
These efforts are reflected, for example, in India’s new patent law, 
where efforts to stimulate the research-based pharmaceutical sec-
tor increasingly conflict with efforts to preserve the well-developed 
capacity of local producers to supply low-cost generic drugs to both 
domestic and foreign consumers.34
More generally, the TRIPS Agreement has thus obliged devel-
oping countries to engage in a delicate balancing act between 
stimulating the production of private knowledge goods, when fea-
sible, and maintaining the supply of essential public goods.35 Pub-
lic international law, however, affords them little guidance in 
choosing normative and practical tools for achieving this balance. 
Rather, the relentless drive to privatize knowledge goods, which 
has picked up even more steam in bilateral and regional FTAs 
since TRIPS (despite implicit promises to the contrary during the 
Uruguay Round), has been accompanied by no comparable collec-
tive action at the intergovernmental level to preserve and coordi-
nate the supply of global public goods. This governance gap per-
sists despite a growing clamor for such initiatives by NGOs en-
 
 31. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 3 & 4. 
 32. United States-Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 (Havana Club), 
January 2, 2002, DSR 2002: II 589, WTO Doc. WT/DS176/AB/R. 
 33.  See Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha Round’s Public 
Health Legacy: Strategies for the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under the 
Amended TRIPS Provisions, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 921 (2007). 
 34. See, e.g., J. M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of 
India’s Patent System and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation (draft version, 
August, 2006), University of Pittsburg School of Law Working Paper Series, Working Paper 
no. 43 at http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/papers/art 43; Janis M. Mueller, Taking TRIPS to 
India—Novartis, Patent Law, and Access to Medicines, 356 NEW ENGLAND J. MEDICINE 54 
(Feb. 8, 2007). 
 35.  For deep conceptual issues, see Peter Drahos, The Regulation of Public Goods, in 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3, at 46-64. 
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gaged in “regime shifting” tactics36 and by the so-called “Friends of 
Development,” who have sought to prod the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) in new, more development-friendly 
directions.37
Indeed, we have no trusted governance mechanism for balanc-
ing public and private interests in this emerging transnational 
system of innovation at all.38 We lack clear theoretical premises or 
empirical evidence to determine which intellectual property stan-
dards would best promote diverse goals over time.39 We have gen-
erated few ideas, and little discussion about how to maintain the 
supply of other global public goods — including knowledge itself — 
under a supra-national intellectual property regime.40 And we 
have not even begun to acknowledge the need to deal with adverse 
distributional impacts, especially on the poor, that even the most 
carefully balanced intellectual property regime may produce.41
 
IV. MAINTAINING THE SUPPLY OF KNOWLEDGE AS A GLOBAL  
PUBLIC GOOD 
 
In the rest of this article, I focus primary attention on the topic 
of innovation itself, and particularly its dependence on the contin-
ued upstream availability of knowledge as both a domestic and a 
global public good. Joseph Stiglitz, the Nobel Prize winner, has 
written brilliantly on this general concept.42 Moreover, recent ef-
forts  to focus attention on both human rights and human welfare 
in the context of overall development goals has added new and 
welcome dimensions to the debate about international IPRs.43 
 
 36. See generally L. R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dy-
namics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2004).  
 37. See infra note 52; for details, see Chon, supra note 8 at 2844-49 (citing authori-
ties). 
 38. Maskus & Reichman, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 
18-20. 
 39. See generally Jerome H. Reichman & R. Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization without 
Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent Law Treaty, 57 DUKE L.J. 
85 (2007). 
 40. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsberg, Toward Supranational Copyright Law?, The WTO 
Panel Decision and the “Three Step Test” for Copyright Exceptions, 187 REVUE INTERNA-
TIONALE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR 3, January 2001 available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=253867; Maskus & Reichman, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS 
AND IP, supra note 3 at 27-33, 41-45; see generally P. Drahos, supra note 35 at 46-68. 
 41. See, e.g., Gerhart, supra note 29; Chon supra note 8. 
 42. See generally Stiglitz, supra note 5. 
 43. See, e.g., Chon, supra note 8 at 2859-909 (stressing access to knowledge as key to 
capacity building); Helfer, supra note 33. See also Peter K. Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellec-
tual Property Interests in a Human Rights Framework, Mich. St. Univ. C. of L., Legal Stud-
ies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 04-01, 2006, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=927335. 
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Nevertheless, these approaches should not deflect attention from 
more specific needs to devise an economically stable innovation 
system potentially of benefit to all countries, even if they raise 
searching questions about distributive justice and larger develop-
mental goals that cannot be ignored. 
For present purposes, I wish to underscore the extent to which 
today’s high protectionist agenda progressively tends to compro-
mise the availability of knowledge inputs needed for future innova-
tion by expanding the protection of contemporary outputs as if 
there were no tomorrow.44 This short-sighted approach threatens 
to disrupt the delicate “ecology of information” that James Boyle 
has eloquently portrayed.45
A fundamental problem is that international trade negotiations 
have not self-consciously postulated the need to seek intellectual 
property norms and incentives that would best advance the incipi-
ent worldwide system of innovation as such.46 On the contrary, 
special interest lobbyists claiming to know what best serves that 
system have promoted normative solutions that maximize rents 
from existing innovation. These self-serving IP proposals are then 
exchanged for trade concessions in other areas that may or may 
not advance the long-term interests of the technology importing 
countries.47
This linkage methodology first evolved in the 1980s, when a 
Cold War political stalemate had blocked the progressive harmoni-
zation of rudimentary international IP standards at WIPO, and 
countries at very different levels of development were unwilling to 
exchange purely IP concessions as such. Once a more robust 
transnational IP system had been installed on the shoulders of the 
 
 44. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca. S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innova-
tion? The Anti-commons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 690 (1998); James Boyle, The 
Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 33 (2003); Arto K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical 
Industry: The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813 (2001); Paul A. 
David, A Tragedy of the Public Knowledge “Commons? Global Science, Intellectual Property 
and the Digital Technology Boomerang, SIEPR Discussion Paper No. 00-02, Stanford Inst. 
for Economic Pol’y Research (2000), available at http://siepr.stanford.edu/papers/pdf/00-
02.html (last visited Jan. 8  2004). 
 45. James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net, 47 
DUKE L.J.  87 (1997). 
 46. See, e.g., JAYASHEE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2001); Susan K. Sell, Trade Issues & HIV/AIDS, 17 EMORY INT’L 
L. R. 591 (2003); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 
369 (2006). See generally G. H. Evans, The Making of the Agreement on Trade-Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property Rights, 18 WORLD COMPETITION 137-180 (1994). 
 47. See, e.g., Suzanne Scotchmer, The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Trea-
ties, 20 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 415 (2004) (showing that these agreements seek to capture posi-
tive externalities and spillovers from existing innovation). 
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TRIPS Agreement, however, continued reliance on this linkage 
methodology has undermined the stability of that very system by 
blinding negotiators to the cumulative social costs of unbalanced, 
over-protectionist IP regimes even in the most advanced econo-
mies. 
Respectable economic inquiry has never been more perplexed 
and uncertain about the potential hazards of our ever-expanding, 
ever more protectionist intellectual property regimes.48 Nor have 
serious efforts been made to reconcile the private and public inter-
ests of countries at different levels of development, with a view to 
optimizing global welfare in a healthy competitive environment.49 
Indeed, in some countries, especially the United States, even the 
word “competition” has become suspect under an antitrust law 
that increasingly views monopoly as a socially desirable tool to 
promote research and development.50 Yet, those who cling to this 
pessimistic Schumpetarean outlook largely ignore, or at least un-
der-appreciate, the extent to which so much of today’s basic re-
search is performed at government expense in universities and 
other government-funded entities. The very success of this growing 
public-private partnership in technological innovation51 could in-
stead justify a greater degree of competition in downstream appli-
cations and improvements than was previously thought economi-
cally desirable. 
While a group of developing countries has recently called for 
sustained economic analysis of these questions at the international 
level,52 the most powerful countries’ trade negotiators relentlessly 
 
 48. See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW 
OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS AND WHAT TO DO 
ABOUT IT (Princeton University Press 2004); David, supra notes 19 & 44; Keith E. Maskus, 
Lessons from Studying the International Economics of Intellectual Property Rights, 52 VAND. 
L. REV. 2219 (2000); Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private Ordering in Information 
Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063 (2000). 
 49. CIPR, supra note 8; Branstetter, supra note 16; see also Ullrich, supra note 19 at 
726-57. 
 50.See, e.g., J. Drexl, Intellectual Property Rights as Constituent Elements of the Market 
Order, paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the International Association for the Ad-
vancement of Teaching and Research in Intellectual Property (ATRIP), Parma, Italy, Sep-
tember 9-11 2006; Eleanor M. Fox, Can Antitrust Policy Protect the Global Commons from 
the Excesses of IPRs?, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 758-69; see 
also S. Ghosh, Comment: Competitive Baselines for Intellectual Property in INTERNATIONAL 
PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 793-814. 
 51. See, e.g., DAVID MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: UNI-
VERSITY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT (Stanford Univer-
sity Press 2004). 
 52. See WIPO General Assembly, Proposal by Argentina and Brazil for the Estab-
lishment of a Development Agenda for WIPO, WIPO Doc. WO/GA/31/11, 27 August 2004; 
Proposal to Establish a Development Agenda for WIPO: An Elaboration of Issues Raised in 
Document WO/GA/31/11, WIPO Doc IIM/1/4, 6 April 2005; Proposal by Morocco on Behalf of 
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seek to export their increasingly dysfunctional intellectual prop-
erty systems to the rest of the world at the very time when those 
systems are in danger of breaking down at home.53 If these trends 
continue unabated, the poorly designed intellectual property 
mechanisms forged in bilateral and multilateral forums could stifle 
rather than accelerate the pace of innovation in the emerging 
transnational system. 
We ignore, for example, the extent to which low eligibility stan-
dards and dubious conceptual formulations have flooded technol-
ogy markets with weak patents that generate thickets of rights 
and other blocking effects, which in turn shift funds away from 
R&D into wasteful litigation and other counter-measures.54 We 
ignore the spreading tentacles of copyright law, which have made 
truly creative expression ever more difficult by narrowing user and 
public-interest safeguards,55 and which have surrounded computer 
programs and other functional works with impenetrable legal and 
technological fences.56 We risk elevating the costs of R&D across 
entire economies through database protection laws so poorly des-
igned57 that they have embarrassed both the highest court called 
 
the African Group Entitled The African Proposal for the Establishment of a Development 
Agenda for WIPO, WIPO Doc IIM/3/2, 18 July 2005. See also S. Musungu & G. Dutfield, 
Multilateral Agreements and a TRIPS-Plus World: The World Intellectual Property Organi-
zation (WIPO), (QUNO/QIAP), TRIPS Issues Paper 3, 2003; C. L. Deere, What Next for the 
Development Agenda at WIPO? Priorities for 2006, BRIDGES, ICTSD, February 2006. 
 53. See, e.g., Maskus & Reichman, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra 
note 3 at 20-23 (citing authorities); Reichman & Dreyfuss, Patent Law Harmonization, su-
pra note 39. 
 54. See supra note 39; Jaffe & Lerner, supra note 48; B.  Verbeure et al., Patent Pools 
and Diagnostic Testing, 24 TRENDS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 115 (2006); Geertrui Van Overwalle 
et al., Models for Facilitating Access to Patents on Genetic Inventions, 7 NATURE REVIEW 
GENETICS 143 (2006); J. Warloin, The Tsunami of Biotech Patents, paper presented to the 
International Workshop on Gene Patents and Clearing Models: From Concepts to Cases, 
Catholic University, Leuven, Belgium, 8-10 June 2006. 
 55. See, e.g., Jerome H. Reichman, Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Pamela Samuelson, A 
Reverse Notice and Takedown Regime to Enable Public Interest Uses of Technically Protected 
Copyrighted Works, 22 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY L.J. 98 (2007).  See also R. Cooper Dreyfuss, 
TRIPS — Round II: Should Users Strike Back, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 21 (2004). Ruth L. 
Okedigi, Sustainable Access to Copyrighted Digital Information Works in Developing Coun-
tries, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3, 142-87. 
 56. See, e.g., Dreier, supra note 9; Pamela Samuelson, Ramdall Davis, Mitchell.D. 
Kapr & Jerome H. Reichman, A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer 
Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2203 (1994); Jerome H. Reichman & Johnathan A. Franklin, 
Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Pub-
lic Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875 (1999); Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention 
Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095 (2003).  
 57. See Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 
1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, O.J. (1996) L 77/20; Jerome H. Reichman and 
Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51 (1997); 
Jerome H. Reichman, Database Protection in a Global Economy, REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE 
DROIT ÉCONOMIQUE, 455 (2002).  
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to enforce them58 and even the legislative entity that spawned 
them.59 And we continue to roll out competition laws and policies 
that claim to advance innovation — as if that were not sufficiently 
the province of IPRs — rather than to reign in anticompetitive ar-
rangements that limit both the diffusion of innovation and the 
pace of improvements.60
Professor Dreier rightly reminds us that the advent of new 
technologies requires some adjustments of pre-existing IP para-
digms and that allowing users and consumers to free-ride on in-
vestments in such technologies would also constitute a short-
sighted policy resulting in market failure.61 But few, if any, repu-
table scholars endorse such policies. The scarecrow of free-riding 
has become a political gambit to steer legislators away from softer 
modalities of protection that could overcome market failure with 
lower social costs and without unnecessarily impeding future inno-
vation.62
 
A. Rationalizing the Protection of Cumulative and Sequential 
Innovation 
 
Professor Dreier has called attention to special problems posed 
by information technologies and biotechnology, in which each new 
advance seems to depend upon a mix of preceding innovative con-
tributions. This phenomenon is, indeed, the problem of “cumula-
tive and sequential innovation,” which I have addressed in a num-
ber of monographs and articles.63
 
 58. See, e.g., Case C-203/02, British Horse-racing Board Ltd v. William Hill Organiza-
tion, Ltd., 2004 E.C.R. I-10415; Case C-46/02, Fixtures Marketing Ltd. v. Oy Veikkaus AB, 
2004 E.C.R. I-10365. 
 59. Commission of the European Communities, First Evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC 
on the Legal Protection of Databases, DG Internal Market and Services working paper, 
Brussels, Dec. 12, 2005, http://europa.eu.int/comm/interval/market/copyright/docs/databases 
/evaluationreporten.pdf. But see Estelle Derclaye, IPRs on Information and Market Power: 
Comparing the European and American Protections of Databases, paper presented to the 
International Association for the Advancement of Teaching and Research in Intellectual 
Property (ATRIP), Parma, Italy, September 9-11, 2006 (advocating European approach with 
certain modifications). 
 60. See Drexl, supra note 50; Fox, supra note 50; Ullrich, supra note 19; see also M.D. 
Janis, “Minimal” Standards for Patent-Related Antitrust Law Under TRIPS, in INTERNA-
TIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 774-792. 
 61. Dreier, supra note 9. See also James Boyle, Enclosing the Genome: What Squab-
bles Over Genetic Patents Could Teach Us, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN 
GENOME PROJECT 97-118 (F. Scott Kieft ed., Elsevier Academic Press  2003).  
 62. Jerome H. Reichman, Saving the Patent Law from Itself, in PERSPECTIVES ON 
PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, supra note 61 at 289-301. 
 63. See Dreier, supra note 9; Jerome H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: 
Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable Innovation 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743 (2002); Jerome H. 
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Traditional patent law presupposes clear boundaries between 
non-obvious inventions, and it proceeds on the assumption that the 
initial inventor is best-equipped to develop the new product or 
process and bring it to market in an efficient manner. The power-
ful exclusive rights of the patent paradigm rest upon both these 
premises and make it possible for innovators to exchange their 
creations for value in the absence of market failure.64
In reality, the conditions of present-day technological innova-
tion increasingly contradict and confound these premises.65 When 
patents are freely granted for merely incremental additions to the 
knowledge stock, as routinely occurs under today’s low eligibility 
requirements, innovations clustering around common technical 
trajectories overlap, with no clear proprietarial lines of demarca-
tion.66 These proliferating patents then give rise to thickets of 
rights that produce blocking effects on both follow-on innovation 
and upstream basic research.67 Scarce resources needed for R&D 
are progressively diverted to litigation seeking judicial clarification 
of boundary lines that are inherently blurred by definition.68
Meanwhile, the pace of innovation is further slowed because 
exclusive property rights in “slivers of innovation” act as a barrier 
to entry to those who must use existing inventions to produce 
value-adding improvements.69 Experience with small-scale innova-
tion in different fields suggests that the market often discerns the 
course of improvements faster than the initial innovator, and that 
would-be competitors would move quickly to invest in value-adding 
improvements but for the potential blocking effects of the first-
comer’s exclusive rights. Exchange often fails to occur because the 
second comers fear to disclose small-scale applications of know-
 
Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 
2342 (1994). 
 64. See, e.g., Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System 20 J.  L. & 
ECON. 265 (1997); Edmund Kitch Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analy-
sis of Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1737 (2000); Robert P. Merges, One Hundred 
Years of Solitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2225-27 
(2000). 
 65. See, e.g., James Bessen & Michelle Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from Empiri-
cal Research on Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1 (2006); Rai, supra note 44; 
Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 44; Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Biotechnology’s Uncer-
tainty Principle, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, supra 
note 61 at 325-53. 
 66. See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 65; see also supra note 54. 
 67. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 65 at 339-353; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Reach-
ing Through the Genome, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PRO-
JECT, supra note 61 at.209-30; Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 41. 
 68. Cf., e.g. W. Kingston, An Agenda for Radical Intellectual Property Reform, in IN-
TERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 653-61. 
 69. See Reichman, Saving the Patent Law from Itself, supra note 62. 
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how to the initial innovator and cannot proceed to deliver value-
adding improvements without incurring the risk of actions for in-
fringement.70 The domestic patent laws, and their sui generis 
counterparts, thus clumsily impede the pace of innovation because 
of a well-intentioned aim to immunize the first-comers from free-
riding appropriations of their initial investments in R&D. 
From a broader perspective, the forgoing analysis shows the 
dominant Cosean model, in which rational actors contract around 
strong and clearly defined exclusive property rights,71 to be at war 
with two pre-existing subsystems on which competitive economies 
traditionally depended. One such subsystem was the set of liability 
rules that governed trade secrets in the past, especially when pat-
ents were hard to obtain because of high eligibility standards, and 
routine engineers could freely provide value-adding improvements 
by reverse-engineering the technical know-how embodied in sub-
patentable innovation.72 The second major subsystem undermined 
by a mindless expansion of exclusive property rights was the Mer-
tonian model of open access and sharing of scientific research re-
sults, which provided a continuous flow of upstream knowledge 
inputs often funded by government science agencies.73 It also com-
plicates the evolution of promising new innovation models based 
on voluntary forms of coordinated collective action.74
From a theoretical perspective, I have elsewhere argued that 
policymakers should be exploring and experimenting with novel 
intellectual property regimes that could defend cumulative and 
sequential innovation against free-riding appropriators without 
unduly blocking value-adding improvements and without depriv-
ing first-comers of a fair share of the revenues from such improve-
ments. To this end, a set of “take and pay” liability rules, known as 
a “compensatory liability regime,” can be fashioned to regulate the 
pace of improvements while impeding wholesale duplication of pro-
 
 70. See Reichman, Green Tulips, supra note 63 (discussing Arrow’s Information Para-
dox). 
 71. See Rober P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 2655 (1994). 
 72. See Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 63. 
 73. See, e.g., Arti Kaur Rai, Evolving Scientific Norms and Intellectual Property 
Rights: A Reply to Kieff, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 707 (2001); Jerome H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, 
A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly Protection-
ist Intellectual Property Environment, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 317 (2003); Graeme B. Din-
woodie & R. Cooper Dreyfuss, Patenting Science: Protecting the Domain of Accessible Knowl-
edge, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION 
LAW 191-221 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Husgenholtz eds., Kluwer Law International 2006) 
[hereinafter Patenting Science].   
 74. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin or Linnux and the Nature of the Firm, 
102 YALE L. J. 369 (2002); see also GLYN MOODY, REBEL CODE: LINUX AND THE OPEN 
SOURCE REVOLUTION (Perseus Books Group 2002). 
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tected small-scale innovation.75 This alternative form of protection 
would provide ex ante entitlements to promote value-adding uses 
of cumulative and sequential innovation with low transaction costs 
and fewer barriers to entry, and it would also avoid many of the 
coordination problems that frustrate the collective action needed 
for complex innovative undertakings.76
This is not the place to explore such proposals in detail. I men-
tion them here because they attempt to address the problems that 
an increasingly dysfunctional intellectual property system has elic-
ited. Many other ambitious proposals are on the table, such as 
open-source initiatives, patent pools, science commons and other 
clearing house models,77 which merit investigation and study. Yet, 
all these worthwhile responses to the pressing problems of the day 
could be compromised if the knowledge cartel that has captured 
the international IP law-making process continues to ratchet up 
ever-more protectionist standards in the name of so-called “har-
monization.” 
 
B. A Moratorium on Stronger International Intellectual Property 
Standard-Setting Exercises 
 
The forgoing discussion suggests that the last thing that an in-
cipient transnational system of innovation needs at the moment 
are additional rounds of international IP law-making exercises. On 
the contrary, the developing countries need a breathing space in 
which to accommodate the social costs of the TRIPS Agreement 
(and posterior TRIPS-plus agreements, if any). They must particu-
larly master the nuances of existing international standards of 
protection, including both built-in and subsequently added flexibil-
ities, with a view to adapting this legal infrastructure to their own 
assets, needs and capabilities.78 At the same time, policymakers in 
 
 75. Reichman, Green Tulips, supra note 63; see also Jerome H. Reichman & Tracy 
Lewis, Using Liability Rules to Stimulate Local Innovation in Developing Countries: Appli-
cation to Traditional Knowledge, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 
337-66. 
 76. See, Tom Dedeurwaerdere, A Philosopher’s View, paper presented to the Interna-
tional Workshop on Gene Patents and Clearing Models: From Concepts to Cases, Catholic 
University, Leuven, Belgium, 8-10 June 2006. 
 77. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANS-
FORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006); JANET HOPE, OPEN SOURCE BIOTECHNOLOGY 
(forthcoming 2008); see generally papers presented to the International Workshop on Gene 
Patents and Clearing Models: From Concepts to Cases, Catholic University, Leuven, Bel-
gium, 8-10 June 2006. 
 78. See, e.g., Dutfield, supra note 14; see generally Mueller supra note 34 (for an in-
depth survey of India’s struggle to reconcile international patent standards with its own 
development goals); see also Abbott & Reichman, supra note 33 (discussing potential impact 
of amended TRIPS provision 31bis). 
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developed countries need to step back and take stock of their grow-
ing intellectual property predicaments, without worsening existing 
problems by further succumbing to the “more is always better” 
propaganda of a powerful knowledge cartel. 
For all these reasons, Keith Maskus and I have called for a 
moratorium on intellectual property standard-setting exercises for 
the immediate future. In our view, “further harmonization is not 
an improper goal, but rather a premature exercise under the new 
and uncertain conditions that attend the development of cutting-
edge technologies generally and information-based technologies in 
particular.”79
Professor Dreier correctly understands our proposal to be di-
rected at developed and developing countries alike.80 Our hope is 
that, as states at different levels of development “accommodate[d] 
existing international [IP] standards to their own nascent or evolv-
ing systems of innovation,” a body of fresh empirical data would 
emerge with which to compare and test different development 
strategies.81 In the long run, such data might make it more feasi-
ble for states to trade further intellectual property concessions 
once again, “on a win-win basis, without coercion and with fewer 
risks that powerful interest groups had rigged the rules to lock in 
fleeting competitive advantages.”82
If developing countries (whose interests vary greatly according 
to per capita GDP and industrial capacities) rallied around the call 
for such a moratorium, it could help them collectively resist bilat-
eral pressures in FTA negotiations that have so far succeeded on a 
“divide and conquer” strategy. These countries should, however, 
remain willing to consider minimalist, good faith responses to new 
or rampant free-riding practices that might unexpectedly emerge 
during the moratorium period.83
 
 79. Maskus & Reichman in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3, at 36. 
See also, Reichman & Cooper Dreyfuss, supra note 39.(For efforts to bolster the recognition 
of foreign judgments obtained under IP laws already conforming to TRIPS standards, see, 
Jane C. Ginsberg, & R. Cooper Dreyfuss, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition 
of Judgments, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MATTERS, 77 CHI.-KENT L. R. 1065 (2002); Yoav 
Ostreicher, The Rise and Fall of the “Mixed” and “Double” Convention Models Regarding 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 338 
(2007). 
 80. See Dreier, supra note 9. 
 81. Maskus & Reichman, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 
37; see also Reichman & Cooper Dreyfuss, supra note 39. 
 82. Maskus & Reichman, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 
37. 
 83. For example, certain rampant forms of free-riding on digital sound recordings 
might require a positive response, in the spirit of TRIPS, even if not clearly covered by 
treaty obligations. By the same token, had developing countries been willing to consider 
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C. New Institutional Initiatives 
 
While both the European Commission and the European Pat-
ent Office84 have recently demonstrated greater awareness of the 
dangers of extending IP protection in the absence of solid economic 
justification, there is no sign that either USTR or the administra-
tion will reduce pressures currently being exerted to stiffen intel-
lectual property standards in multilateral, regional, and bilateral 
forums.85 Accordingly, if a healthy worldwide system of innovation 
is to emerge in the post-TRIPS environment, the need for a proper 
balance of public and private interests within that system is factu-
ally dependent on the developing countries’ ability to resist the 
drive to re-regulate the world economy. Important in this regard 
was the WIPO Development Agenda,86 and other parallel initia-
tives, such as the Access to Essential Medicines87 and Access to 
Knowledge88 campaigns, whose mission it is to document develop-
ing country complaints about how they may be ill-served by TRIPS 
and TRIPS-plus standards of IP protection. 
At the same time, we need more reliable information about how 
IPRs may be helping the developing countries, especially in certain 
fields and at certain levels of per capita GDP.89 In so doing, it is 
important to take account of the different conditions affecting dif-
ferent industrial sectors in these countries. For example, while a 
stronger patent regime has certainly caused problems for Brazil’s 
public health program,90 that country has become a major innova-
 
early U.S. proposals for compensatory fees for access to clinical trial data, they might have 
avoided the imposition of tough exclusive rights regimes in recent FTAs. See, e.g., Jerome 
Reichman, The International Legal Status of Undisclosed Clinical Trial Data: From Private 
to Public Goods?, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDI-
CINES, EarthScan, (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter Negotiating Health]. 
 84. See Interviews for the Future, European Patent Office, 2006. 
 85. See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 14. 
 86. See, supra note 52. 
 87. See, e.g., Access to Essential Medicines Campaign, Doctors Without Borders, 
http://www.accessmed-msf.org; Karin Timmermans, Ensuring Access to Medicines in 2004 
and Beyond, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 83 at 41-54; Frederick M. Abbott, Manag-
ing the Hydra: The Herculean Task of Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines in INTERNA-
TIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP 393-424, supra note 3. 
 88. See, e.g., CPTech, Draft Treaty on Access to Knowledge, 9 May 2005, available at 
http://www.cptech.org. 
 89. See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 34 (case of Indian pharmaceutical industry); Straus, 
supra note 26; Michael P. Ryan, Brazil’s Quiet Bio-Medical Innovation Revolution: Drugs, 
Patents, and the ‘10/90 Health Research Gap,’ Creative and Innovative Economy Center 
Research Paper (2006), available at http://www.law.gwu.edu/Academics/CIEC/Research+ 
Papers.htm; see also Ryan, supra note 22. 
 90. See, e.g., Mirta Levis, Role, Perspectives and Challenges of the Generic Pharmaceu-
tical Industry in Latin America, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH, 55-63, supra note 83; see also 
Barbara Rosenberg, Market Concentration of the Transnational Pharmaceutical Industry 
and the Generic Industries: Trends on Mergers, Acquisitions and Other Transactions, in 
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tor and exporter in the aircraft industry and, allegedly, in the bio-
medical sector as well.91 IPRs may have played a positive role in 
both cases.  
Similarly, some Indian and Chinese pharmaceutical companies 
are reportedly well-positioned to benefit from universal patent 
norms, even if many smaller Indian firms may be denied prior op-
portunities to reverse-engineer cheap generic drugs.92 Ideally, our 
quest for reliable empirical studies of what actually transpires in 
developing countries should enable scholars and policymakers bet-
ter to differentiate the situations in low and middle-income coun-
tries from those at a more advanced state of industrialization.93
Because today’s most scientifically and commercially valuable 
knowledge goods are likely to be products of cumulative and se-
quential innovation, all countries — not just developing countries 
— need norms that reinforce the natural sharing ethos of public 
science and that expand the semi-commons of nonpatentable or 
subpatentable ideas and know-how accessible to routine engi-
neers.94 To this end, the developing countries in particular need to 
embrace a pro-competitive ethos by strengthening their capacities 
and technologies of reverse-engineering.95 They need to experi-
ment with new intellectual property models, including those based 
on open-source solutions and on the strategic use of liability rules, 
which can cure market failures without impeding follow-on inno-
vation and without creating barriers to entry. 
Above all, developing countries need to formulate suitable com-
petition law rules and policies (hopefully coordinated) to ensure 
that foreign technologies and know-how flow to local markets at 
prices local entrepreneurs can afford. In so doing, they should also 
make use of competition law exceptions in the TRIPS-Agreement 
 
NEGOTIATING HEALTH, 65 & 73-75, supra note 83. 
 91. See supra note 89. 
 92. See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 34; Timmermans, supra note 87 at 50-53. See also 
Joan Rovira, Creating and Promoting Domestic Drug Manufacturing Capabilities: A Solu-
tion for Developing Countries?, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH, 227-40, supra note 83. 
 93. See generally KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMY (Institute for International Economics 2000); Phillip McCalman, Reaping What 
You Sow: An Empirical Analysis of International Patent Harmonization, 55 J  INT’L ECON. 
161 (2001); Maskus, Lessons, supra note 48, at 2224-39. 
 94. See supra text accompanying notes 63-76; see also R. Cooper Dreyfuss & G. Din-
woodie, WTO Dispute Resolution and the Preservation of the Public Domain of Science Un-
der International Law in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 861-883 
(providing innovative proposals); Marianne Levin & Annette Kur, Towards More Balanced, 
User Friendly Paradigms in IP Law: A Project to Reform TRIPS, Special Session: the IP in 
Transition Research Programme presented to the International Association for the Ad-
vancement of Teaching and Research in Intellectual Property (ATRIP) conference in Parma, 
Italy, (Sep. 5, 2006) (providing innovative proposals). 
 95. See supra note 29. 
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to obtain bulk access to educational and scientific texts at prices 
the local educational community can afford.96
Ideally, all developing countries should experimentally be test-
ing different approaches to stimulating and disseminating innova-
tion in their national and regional systems of innovation and to 
defining the relevant supporting legal standards that could prove 
effective for different players at different levels of development, all 
of whom are necessarily operating within the incipient transna-
tional system of innovation. Valid experiments of this kind should 
eventually lead to bottom up proposals for future intellectual prop-
erty standards that are demonstrably consistent with development 
goals and that suitably reconcile public and private interests at 
national, regional and, ultimately, global levels.97
Another overarching goal for developing countries is to experi-
ment with new techniques, strategies and institutions for main-
taining the supply of knowledge as a public good. While this di-
mension was painfully ignored during the multilateral trade nego-
tiations that gave birth to the TRIPS Agreement, governments in 
the most technologically advanced countries clearly understand 
the importance of funding basic research and the need to provide 
critical upstream inputs for groundbreaking scientific research, 
which the private sector cannot sustain. 98 Yet, one of the biggest 
defects of multilateral and bilateral standard-setting exercises, 
without public interest negotiators seated at the table, is precisely 
the emergence of a one dimensional normative infrastructure that 
can make the provision of the public good side of innovation ever 
harder and more costly.99
In this regard, we must particularly ensure that developing 
countries are connected to the worldwide flow of scientific and 
technical information, in what UNESCO calls the drive for 
“knowledge societies,”100 a goal that will require restraints on elec-
tronic fencing of disembodied information.101 We will need better 
research exemptions to all intellectual property regimes. We must 
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ensure that both government-funded and government-generated 
scientific research results are widely disseminated at affordable 
costs.102 And we need to encourage developing countries to invest 
wisely in forms of public-private cooperation that focus on capacity 
building in universities and on the transfer of both innovative ca-
pacity and technology from the public to the private sectors. 
In so doing, we must also take pains to distinguish problems of 
distributive injustice from problems directly dependent on IPRs. 
While these issues are often interrelated, Peter Gerhart’s recent 
work shows that we have not thought enough about how developed 
countries cope with distributional aspects “behind the scenes,” and 
why this absence of secondary coping mechanisms magnifies the 
social costs of IPRs in developing countries.103
Finally, looking beyond innovation as such, we must find ways 
to ensure that progress in stimulating the production of knowledge 
goods leads to the support of other public goods, such as public 
health, agriculture, the environment, education and scientific re-
search generally. In other words, we must reverse the trend that 
makes the globalization of private knowledge goods increasingly at 
odds with the provision of global public goods, and instead take 
steps to ensure that the emerging transnational system of innova-
tion adequately fosters and supports the supply of both, in an envi-
ronment that remains responsive to basic human needs and fun-
damental human rights.104
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The TRIPS Agreement of 1994 is usually characterized as a 
technical harmonization exercise that consecrates basic standards 
of intellectual property protection established in developed coun-
tries. From that perspective, there has been a sustained emphasis 
on compliance by other countries that must conform their laws and 
practices to these international standards, and on the need for still 
higher levels of protection that technology exporting countries de-
mand in the name of efficiency and wealth maximization.105
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In contrast, Maskus and I contend that, perhaps as an unin-
tended consequence, the TRIPS Agreement has spawned an incipi-
ent transnational system of innovation, which could provide 
worldwide incentive effects with positive gains for both innovation 
and welfare. A number of developing countries, including Brazil, 
Chile, China, India, Malaysia and Thailand have taken steps to 
profit from these opportunities, and critics of globalization ignore 
these growing successes at their peril.106
Higher intellectual property standards have nonetheless en-
gendered new problems for all countries, and they have particu-
larly complicated the already arduous task of formulating and im-
plementing economic development strategies in poor countries.107 
In his early work, Maskus emphasized that IP regimes were but 
one component of a healthy, development-oriented economy and 
that, without a broader, well-coordinated infrastructure that in-
cluded corporate law, bankruptcy law, and a solid educational sys-
tem, among other variables, IP protection might add little to eco-
nomic growth in its own right.108 In a perceptive recent article, 
Margaret Chon argues that the interrelation between IPRs and 
overall development policies may be far more complex than was 
previously understood, and that differential and more favorable 
treatment — which Professor Chon calls “substantive equality” — 
will become essential if developing countries are to succeed in the 
post-TRIPS environment.109
Other recent studies have focused on the interplay of private 
and public goods in a healthy, pro-competitive global economy.110 
One key phenomenon here is the extent to which expanding inter-
national IP legislation to support the “globalization of private 
knowledge goods” has increasingly burdened and complicated de-
veloping country efforts to achieve broader development goals that 
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provide both measurable economic growth and equitable access to 
the fruits of growth for poor and disadvantaged citizens.111 While 
history demonstrates that the enforcement of intellectual property 
rights and the pursuit of overall economic welfare are not anti-
thetical in relatively free-market economies, as some human rights 
declarations expressly recognize, the one-sided emphasis on pri-
vate rights in the WTO and WIPO law-making processes has made 
it far more difficult than in the past for most developing countries 
to bridge the technology divide112 and to maintain the supply of 
such basic public goods as health, education, food security, envi-
ronmental protection and even a pro-competitive economic envi-
ronment. 
In this regard, they have so far received little comfort from the 
WTO Dispute Settlement apparatus, which has tended to ignore 
adverse distributional effects of the TRIPS standards, despite cer-
tain enabling provisions in that agreement.113 While recent legisla-
tive concessions regarding public health adopted by the WTO114 
may be seen as a partial response to demands for less “formal 
equality”115 and more “substantive equality,”116 the developing 
countries have largely been left on their own to sort out the devel-
opmental difficulties that TRIPS and post-TRIPS pressures have 
engendered.117
From a broader perspective, the incipient transnational system 
of innovation that the TRIPS Agreement brought to life in 1994 
needs time and a stable competitive environment in which to grow 
and flourish through the efforts of entrepreneurs in both developed 
and developing countries, without further top-down regulatory in-
terference from misguided protectionist legislation. WTO Members 
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must be allowed broad latitude to ensure that this system remains 
pro-competitive, with affordable access to knowledge inputs and 
outputs for both creators and users of knowledge goods. By the 
same token, WTO Members must retain sufficient autonomy and 
power to preserve the supply of global public goods that are indis-
pensable to both growth and welfare in a properly functioning 
worldwide intellectual property regime.118
With specific regard to the promotion of innovation as such, 
concerned governments must make strenuous efforts to resist 
claims that the technology exporting industries know what is best 
for the rest of the world. In reality, legal scholars and economists 
have never been less certain about the levels of IP protection likely 
to preserve these industries’ long-term competitive advantages 
even in their home countries.119 We do not stand at the end of in-
tellectual property history, as the high-protectionist lobby wants 
us to believe. Nor will ever-stronger IPRs and ever higher levels of 
harmonization redound to the benefit of even the most developed 
countries, let alone the rest of the world. 
On the contrary, we have crossed a new historical threshold 
where an emerging transnational system of innovation in an inte-
grated global market place with an interconnected research com-
munity breeds unprecedented opportunities and uncharted means 
of realizing them. Far from locking in the sixteenth and twentieth 
century intellectual property models of the past, we need new 
models, and we need time and space to experiment with them, and 
with new legal approaches to finding the best balance of private 
and public interests for this global economy. It is precisely a time 
for experimentation,120 comparable to the period in the 1880s, 
when the Paris and Berne Conventions were first negotiated. It is 
not a time to codify obsolete approaches and standards that are 
likely to boomerang against the long-term interests of developed 
countries as well as to undermine economic growth and human 
welfare in the developing countries. 
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